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This thesis explores the conditions under which corruption scandals generate 
large-scale public backlash using a comparative case study of the Mensalão and 
Petrolão corruption scandals in Brazil. Drawing on public opinion data and content 
analysis of newspaper coverage of scandals, it explores the effects of a number of 
factors in shaping public reaction to corruption scandals, including economic climate, 
type of corruption, and media framing. The findings indicate that while media engages 
in first order agenda setting – establishing corruption scandals as important events – it 
only sometimes engages in second order agenda setting by framing corruption scandals 
and politicians in a positive or negative light. In addition, the data reveals that in Brazil, 
the state of the economy is a strong determining factor that shapes public perceptions 
concerning the importance of corruption as a major issue. Lastly, the results indicate 
that the Brazilian public did not distinguish between the different types of corruption, 
and instead protested and demanded the end of corruption generally.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction   
Two major political corruption scandals have recently engulfed Brazil eliciting 
mass media attention both nationally and internationally. The first scandal, known as 
the Mensalão, encompassed vote buying in Congress utilizing public funds to pay for 
political support from coalition parties. The second scandal, referred to as the Petrolão, 
revolves around Petrobras, Brazil’s largest oil company, and a bribery scheme for 
obtaining lucrative construction project contracts. Corruption does not represent 
anything new in Brazil, although the scale and the systematic implementation of the 
political corruption schemes over the last decade are unprecedented. When the first 
corruption scandal was revealed in 2005, relatively little large-scale public backlash 
ensued, and the president Lula da Silva remained extremely popular in the public’s 
perception. However, when the second corruption scandal emerged in 2014, millions of 
Brazilians took to the streets across Brazil and around the globe in protest, calling for 
the impeachment of the president Dilma Rousseff and an end to corruption.    
This leads us to ask, in a country with longstanding, systemic corruption, why 
do some corruption scandals lead to widespread public discontent and others produce 
little public reaction? Under what conditions will revelations of corruption lead to 
acceptance and apathy and under what conditions will it lead to protests in the streets? 
This study draws on a comparative case study of the Mensalão and Petrolão scandals, 
public opinion data, and content analysis of newspaper coverage of scandals to explore 
the effects of a number of factors in shaping public reaction to corruption scandals 
including economic climate, type of corruption, and media framing. 
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National and Scandal Context 
Corruption has long been an issue in the Brazilian political sphere, ranging from 
pork-barrel politics to vote-buying for the formation of coalitions to personal graft and 
kickbacks. According to Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions 
Index, which ranks countries by perceived levels of corruption based on surveys of 
business and other experts, Brazil ranks 79th out of 176 countries with a score of 40 out 
of 100 (0 correlates with highly corrupt and 100 very clean). This indication of systemic 
corruption in Brazil is detrimental in many regards and has vast political, economic, and 
social consequences, particularly in terms of achieving developmental goals. Brazil’s 
soft power influence as one of the BRICs nations depends greatly upon the quality of its 
democratic institutions (Sotero & Armijo, 2007), whose legitimacy can be dramatically 
affected by corrupt practices. When permeated throughout political institutions, 
corruption creates unnecessary red tape, political inefficiency, and diminishes public 
trust in democratic institutions. Corruption can also hinder economic growth, interfere 
with international development aid, weaken the effectiveness of judicial institutions, 
hamper the efficiency and quality of public services, perpetuate hierarchies of high 
levels of inequality, and contribute to escalating discontent – which can lead to 
instability and violence. 
 In this manner, corruption poses tremendous threats due to the manifold 
negative social consequences. Public perception of high levels of corruption within 
leading institutions generate popular discontent and can foster a climate in which mass 
social uprising can manifest. In Brazil, this occurred during the large-scale protests that 
erupted in 2013 before the FIFA World Cup, in 2015 during the Rio Summer Olympics, 
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and in 2016 surrounding the former president Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment. From 
personal experience as a Brazilian-American who has traveled extensively to Brazil, I 
believe that Brazilians accept corruption as part of the political landscape – something 
unavoidable and pervasive. Citizens commonly believe that corruption permeates 
political institutions and that little to nothing can be done to solve the issue in the short 
term. This thought pattern often justifies corruption on a small scale, especially if it 
advances personal gain.  
How then should we view public outcry in the face of corruption scandals? On 
the one hand, media coverage of corruption scandals foster public discontent that can 
lead to instability due to a lack of trust in political leaders, and might weaken the 
public’s faith in democratic institutions. Yet public outcry is also essential in the fight 
against corruption as it pressures the government to root out dishonest officials and 
reform institutions. Although it comes with risks, then, public discontent in the face of 
corruption may ultimately be seen as positive. 
Yet levels of tolerance of the current state of affairs and public outcry in the face 
of corruption scandals varies over time, for reasons that remain underexplored in the 
literature. This paper can serve as a step towards understanding this variance and 
challenging Brazilians’ fatalistic views regarding the necessary persistence of 
corruption. Its findings will have implications not only for our understanding of public 
perception of corruption in Brazil, but in other countries that suffer from systemic 
corruption as well. Below I explore the existing literature’s predictions regarding the 
influence of three sets of factors on public perceptions of corruption scandals: type of 
corruption, economic context, and media coverage and framing. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
Defining and Categorizing Corruption 
Defining corruption is a contested task, as a definition necessarily entails 
narrowing an idea to include certain elements at the expense of others. For my thesis I 
utilize the most common definition of corruption: “the abuse of public office for private 
gain” (Bussell, 2015). This definition indicates that a public official misuses his/her 
assigned power, but does not address other components involved in the discourse, such 
as the issues of morality and legality. On the one hand, the ethical dimension can be 
intrinsic to corruption as a corrupt act reflects an immoral behavior that deviates from 
societal expectations. Yet on the other hand, corruption can also be separated from 
morality, and whether a given action is ethical or not may not be critical in certain 
contexts. The link between corruption and morality relates particularly to culture and to 
different religions (Cockroft, 2012). Since certain traditions place a higher emphasis on 
ethical behavior than others, a definition in which morality is central does not make 
sense in a society that does not maintain the same value system.   
The second dimension that the previous definition excludes relates to legality. If 
the definition of corruption includes a direct connection between corruption and 
legality, then the attention focuses only on condemning illegal practices but does not 
consider actions that are legal but corrupt in nature. This poses challenges for a cross-
national dialogue because there are certain practices, such as lobbying, which are 
considered perfectly legal and accepted in one country, yet illegal and unacceptable in 
another nation. This also complicates a consistent agreement regarding corruption 
across contexts. In this sense, there are many nuances associated with the definition of 
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corruption that affect how corrupt behavior is perceived across time, and space and that 
shape the manner in which corrupt individuals can be held accountable. Though 
framing corruption in a specific, simple context through a narrow definition risks 
minimizing the nuanced nature of the issue itself, for the purposes of academic research 
as well as to effectively prosecute corruption, a standard definition of corruption must 
be formulated and employed.  
In addition to leaving out certain elements, defining corruption as ‘the abuse of 
public office for private gain’ is necessarily vague and does not distinguish between 
different types of corruption, nor the motives behind corrupt acts. A universally 
accepted typology of corruption does not exist, and scholars vary on how to separate the 
numerous forms of corrupt practices. Yet the reality that varying types, levels, and 
motives for corrupt practices exist, requires that the complex dynamics be examined 
and separated into distinct categories. Often times these acts overlap or are a 
combination of different components. Yet it is necessary to distinguish different forms 
of corruption in order to better understand not only the causes, consequences, and how 
to fight it, but also in order to identify how public opinion varies regarding perceptions 
of corruption scandals and corrupt politicians. Generally speaking, scholars tend to 
typologize corruption based on one or more of the following five axes (1) magnitude, 
(2) the nature of the transaction, (3) the broader context, (4) the outcome, and (5) the 
motive or purpose. 
The first category relates to the magnitude of a corrupt practice. In this sense, 
corruption can either be “grand/high-level corruption” or “petty/low-level corruption”, 
which differentiates the size, the institutional location of the key actors, and the relative 
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frequency of the acts (Heywood, 1997; Morris, 2011; Vargas, 2009). Grand corruption 
involves large sums of money, high-level government officials, and occurs less 
frequently, whereas petty corruption encompasses smaller amounts of money, low-level 
civil servants or bureaucratic workers, and occurs relatively regularly. Another basic 
characteristic involves the different roles and norms that the key figures must abide by 
and relates to political corruption and bureaucratic/administrative corruption (Morris, 
2011; Vargas, 2009; Zyglidopoulos, 2016). “Political corruption” occurs at the 
policymaking stage and violates second-order norms, which means that behavior 
deviates from the unwritten guidelines that establish how politicians should make 
decisions. “Bureaucratic/administrative corruption” ensues in relation to the 
implementation of policy and violates first-order norms, which are the written rules and 
regulations. 
A second method of differentiating types of corruption considers the nature of 
the transaction, generating the following categories: transactive, exhortive, defensive, 
investive, nepotistic, autogenic, and supportive (Alatas, 1990 cited in Heywood 1997 
and Morris 2011). “Transactive corruption” occurs when both the contributor and the 
recipient agree to the act and the outcome will be of mutual advantage to both parties. 
On the other hand, “exhortive corruption” transpires when one of the parties is coerced 
into the scheme, usually to avoid harm. “Defensive corruption” refers to the corrupt act 
that the victim of extortion is forced to perform. “Investive corruption” involves an act 
with no immediate recompense, but with the understanding that this will be beneficial 
for the acquisition of a future favor. “Nepotistic corruption” encompasses favoring or 
appointing friends or relatives to a position of power because of kinship connections, 
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not because they are qualified for the position. “Autogenic corruption” entails an 
individual benefiting, for example from preexisting knowledge of a policy outcome. 
Lastly, “supportive corruption” comprises actions to protect and strengthen existing 
corruption patterns.  
The third category relates to the broader pattern of corruption within the system 
and takes the context into consideration. Corruption can be “incidental,” which occurs 
rarely, “institutional,” meaning that corruption transpires within an institution usually 
due to a lack of controls, or “systemic,” in that corrupt practices are inherent within the 
system or deeply entrenched in society (Robinson, 1988 as cited in Morris, 2011, p. 11). 
This category can also distinguish between “centralized” and “decentralized” corruption 
depending upon the control that the political elite maintains over local officials and the 
probability that bribes will result in the desired outcome (Shleifer & Vishny 1993; 
Bardhan, 2006 as cited in Morris, 2011, p. 11). Institutional, systemic, and centralized 
types all share intricate layers and channels of payoffs within the government system 
that usually benefit political parties or powerful leaders (Morris, 2011).  
The fourth category relates to the outcome of a corrupt practice (Beare, 1997; 
Heidenheimer 1989; Lessig, 2013). This type of corruption is epitomized in Lessig’s 
(2013) definition of “institutional corruption”: a systemic and strategic influence which 
is legal or ethical that undermines an institution’s effectiveness by diverting it from its 
purpose or weakening its ability to achieve its purpose, including weakening either the 
public’s trust in that institution or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness (p. 553). 
This perspective of institutional corruption focuses upon the outcome, which is that an 
institution is diverted or weakened from accomplishing its purpose. Another manner in 
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which to distinguish types of corruption based upon outcome comes from 
Heidenheimer’s (1989) three categories of “public-office-centered”, “market-centered”, 
and “public-interest-centered” corruption (as cited in Johnston, 2001; Nye, 1967; van 
Klaveren, 1957; Friedrich, 1966). “Public-office-centered corruption” refers to behavior 
that deviates from the duties of a public official for private gain. “Market-centered 
corruption” relates to the intrusion of market incentives into decision-making where an 
official sees their position as a business and seeks to maximize their profits. “Public-
interest-centered corruption” occurs when an official is induced to take actions that 
favor the provider of a reward and that damage the public interest. Yet another view that 
focuses upon the outcomes of corruption encompasses four possible dimensions (Beare, 
1997): “bribes/kickbacks,” in which money is demanded or expected in order to do 
legitimate business (such as to compete or win contracts); “election/campaign 
corruption,” where illicit payments are made during an election to ensure continued 
influence; “protected corruption,” when officials accept payments from criminal groups 
in exchange for approval to engage in illegitimate business (i.e. drug trafficking); and 
“systemic top-down corruption,” when powerful elites systematically divert a country’s 
wealth.  
The final manner in which to distinguish forms of corruption, and the one which 
is of particular interest in the context of this study, is based upon purpose or motive, 
(Heywood, 1997; Morris, 2011; Weyland, 1998). Heywood (1997) distinguishes 
between “personal” and “institutional” corruption, in which personal corruption is 
aimed towards personal enrichment, and institutional corruption seeks to benefit an 
institution such as a political party. Within a similar framework, Weyland (1998) 
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proposes a similar distinction be based on purpose, in which corruption can either be 
utilized for political or personal purposes. In terms of political reasons, politicians or 
public officials can sell decisions in order to gain funds for future election campaigns. 
The other type is personally motivated, such as exploiting bribery for the accumulation 
of private wealth.  
According to the vast majority of the literature, the Mensalão and Petrobras 
scandals would fall into the same category, as both are examples of grand, high level, 
systemic, political corruption. Yet the latter classification above offers more nuanced 
distinctions that are relevant for the cases at hand, as the corruption involved in the 
Mensalão was meant to grease the political wheels and get legislation passed, whereas 
the corruption involved in the Petrobras scandal was primarily for personal enrichment, 
albeit of a very large number of people (because a lot of the money was used for Caixa 
2, as is becoming more and more apparent). One could argue that it was also meant for 
the maintenance of the structure of power, i.e. making sure the same elected officials or 
corrupt politicians get (re)elected). I hypothesize that these scandals can therefore be 
viewed as distinct based on their diverging underlying intents, and that these diverging 
intents are likely to affect levels of public reaction. The public might be more tolerant of 
corruption that is based upon forming a coalition to pass legislation in Congress than 
they would towards corruption based upon the profitability of construction companies 
for personal gain of executives and politicians. Thus, my thesis seeks to investigate 
whether the variation in the intent of the different types of corruption involved in the 
scandals is significantly portrayed within the media content analysis.  
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Economic Climate as Shaping Public Opinion 
The state of the economy comprises a key factor that commonly influences 
public opinion. If the economy is doing well, individuals are more likely to view issues 
or situations positively, but if the economy is doing poorly, public attitudes and beliefs 
can easily become negative. The influence of the economic environment on public 
views is well-documented in relation to topics as varied as voting patterns (Klašnja & 
Tucker, 2013), executive approval (Carlin, Love, & Martinez-Gallardo, 2015), second-
level agenda setting (Hester & Gibson, 2003), support for markets and democracy 
(Graham & Sukhtankar, 2004), immigration reform (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 
1997), prejudicial stereotypes and immigration policy (Burns& Gimpel, 2000), and 
concern with climate change (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012).  
Regarding voting patterns, Klašnja and Tucker (2013) investigate how 
corruption affects voting behavior when economic conditions are poor. Their results 
indicate that in a nation with low levels of corruption (e.g., Sweden), voters react 
negatively to corruption regardless of the economic state, whereas in a country with 
high levels of corruption (e.g., Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only 
when the economy is doing poorly, but the issue becomes less important when the 
economy is doing well. These findings have important implications for understanding 
the relationship between the state of the economy and public opinion relating to the 
corruption cases in Brazil. Like Moldova, Brazil is ranked as a country where 
corruption is high and viewed as a systemic problem. If the results of the Klašnja and 
Tucker study are applied to Brazil, one concludes that voters will react negatively 
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towards corruption when the state of the economy is poor, but not necessarily when the 
economy is doing well.  
A similar pattern emerges when the effect of the economy on public opinion is 
studied in relation to presidential accountability. Carlin, Love, and Martinez-Gallardo 
(2015) seek to explain the variations in accountability relating to the diverging 
outcomes of scandals on presidential popularity across Latin America. Their study 
posits that presidential accountability is linked to the ability of a president to manage 
the economy well, focusing upon inflation and unemployment as principal indicators of 
the state of the economy. The study proposes the theory of conditional accountability, in 
which the public punishes presidents for corruption scandals when the economy is 
weak, whereas under strong economic conditions the scandals do not tarnish 
presidential standing in the public view. By examining a presidential approval dataset 
for 18 Latin American countries, the study found evidence that scandals only appear to 
damage presidential approval when unemployment and inflation are high. These results 
thus support the thesis that accountability for scandals is less likely when the economy 
performs well, but more likely when the economy is doing poorly. If these findings hold 
true, it can be supposed that when unemployment and inflation are high (as was the case 
in Brazil during the Petrolão scandal) citizens will be more inclined to hold executives 
accountable. This in fact did occur, as Dilma’s impeachment exemplifies. She was not 
impeached due to the Petrolão directly (in fact it was due to mismanagement of the 
economy, making up economic numbers to receive better electoral results) but the 
scandal certainly contributed to discrediting her competence in the public view.  
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Yet another context in which a similar relationship plays out relates to public 
support for markets and democracy in Latin America. Graham and Sukhtankar (2004) 
investigate the effects of economic crisis upon individual well-being and on public 
support for market policies and democracy. The study indicated that economic crises 
have negative effects on happiness levels in Latin America, which in turn influences 
attitudes regarding economic and political behavior. Corruption was a strong factor in 
respondent’s criticism of democracy and the market, where wealthier, more informed 
people were more likely to view corruption as a serious issue (Graham & Sukhtankar, 
2004). These findings are important because an individual’s perceived wellbeing can 
shape public attitudes and decisions regarding political behaviors. So if the economy 
does poorly and an individual’s wellbeing declines, this in turn affects public 
perceptions of politicians and political parties.   
The effect of the economy on public opinion is also significant in relation to 
issues of climate change (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). Their study, based upon public 
opinion data, suggests that the public decline in belief about climate change is driven by 
economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012). The 
data suggests that poor economic conditions due to the recent economic downturn 
dramatically affected the declining concern about climate change. The public’s apparent 
ambivalence about climate change poses serious issues, as public opinion can be an 
important factor in shaping policy change and political platforms. Economic conditions 
are continuously shifting, labor market conditions fluctuate, and the global economic 
system is volatile, bringing considerable uncertainty about public perceptions and 
attitudes towards this serious global issue.   
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The economy also has an indirect effect on public opinion depending on how it 
is portrayed through the media. Hester and Gibson (2003) examine how the tone of 
media coverage of the economy influences general public attitudes towards current and 
future economic performance. The results indicate that news coverage influences public 
confidence in the economy. Neither negative nor positive news was found to be a 
significant predictor of the public evaluation of current economic conditions, yet 
negatively framed news was found to impact attitudes regarding future economic 
conditions.  
This distinction is interesting to note because individuals maintain direct contact 
with the current economic situation in daily interactions, yet do not have direct exposure 
to future economic conditions. It is assumed that people make judgments based upon 
personal experience first, but rely on media to gain information about issues that are out 
of reach, and so turn to the news for predictions and opinions about the future state of 
the economy. Similarly, most Brazilians are not in direct contact with grand, high-level 
political corruption in Brazil, and thus will seek out the news for information about how 
the situation is progressing. Thus, when exploring the determinants of public reaction to 
corruption scandals, one cannot ignore the crucial role of the media – it is to this that we 
now turn. 
Media’s Agenda Setting and Framing Corruption Scandals 
The media plays an important role in preventing, uncovering, and combating 
corruption. Stapenhurst (2000) proposes that journalism serves as an impediment to 
corruption in tangible ways that include, for example: investigating and exposing 
corrupt officials, prompting investigations and judicial proceedings by official bodies, 
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the impeachment or forced resignation of a corrupt politician or official, and fostering 
pressure for changes to laws and regulations that create a climate favorable to 
corruption (p. 3). Media reporting also disseminates intangible effects that are harder to 
measure and comprise, for example, the checks on corruption that result from a broader 
social climate of political pluralism and an enhanced sense of accountability among 
politicians and institutions (Stapenhurst, 2000, p.3). In this sense, the media can act as 
an effective tool in curbing corruption.  
In contrast, however, increased media coverage of corruption scandals also 
holds a unique paradox in that on the one hand, a “free and fair media” media is 
exposing corrupt practices and fulfilling their “watchdog” role, but on the other hand, 
this can actually increase the levels of perceived corruption within a nation. When the 
public reads more about corruption, anxiety and fear can increase, propagating the 
belief that corrupt practices are more prevalent in a given society than the reality 
reflects. This becomes apparent especially in comparison with other nations in which 
corruption occurs more frequently within government institutions, yet lower levels of 
perceived corruption prevail, as the media is not exposing the illicit behaviors to the 
same extent.  
These notions can be applied to the Brazilian corruption cases in the sense that 
both the tangible and intangible effects are evident, as well as the paradox of 
investigative journalism; the media coverage of the scandals contributes to consolidate 
the perception of high levels of corruption in Brazil, but at the same time plays a crucial 
role in combating corruption by exposing the schemes and prompting investigations that 
help to hold politicians and business men accountable.      
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In addition to the functions described above, the main role of the media is to 
provide critical information and insights to inform the public regarding key issues. Mass 
media news is widely accessible in a variety of formats through newspapers, television, 
radio, internet, and on social media platforms. The manner in which a story is presented 
and the amount of media attention the story receives has the potential to substantially 
shape public attitudes. The main theories that explain how the media influences public 
opinion are agenda setting and second-level agenda setting, the latter similar to the 
concept of framing. 
Agenda-setting theory proposes that extensive media coverage of an issue 
provides salience cues to the public regarding the relative importance of an issue 
(McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McCombs, 2002). Many news stories are available daily, yet 
due to limited time and space, decisions regarding which stories should be given more 
attention to are constantly made. Media outlets have the power to decide which issues 
will receive greater attention (more airtime, more articles, etc.) and which issues will 
not. Some issues will inevitably be left out and the audience will not receive salience 
cues regarding their relative importance. Thus, the public learns about the relative 
importance of certain issues depending upon how much that issue is covered in the 
press, greater media coverage increasing the public’s perceived importance of a given 
issue. McCombs and Shaw (1972) established this branch of research and numerous 
studies have been conducted that support the theory that the media’s concern with a 
certain news topic determines the perceived salience of that issue in public opinion 
(Golan & Wanta, 2001; Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004; Kiousis & Wu, 2008; McLeod & 
Hertog 1992; and Sadaf, 2011). 
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Second-level agenda-setting theory combines traditional agenda-setting with 
media frames, which are “the central organizing idea for news content that supplies a 
context and suggests what the issues is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion 
and elaboration” (Tankard et al., 1991 cited in Golan & Wanta, 2001, p. 248). Media 
outlets frame issues when they “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993 as cited in Golan & Wanta, 
2001, p. 248). The manner in which public affairs are “framed” by the mass media 
affects how the public perceives those issues. Thus framing contributes to second-level 
agenda setting in which issues are not only rendered salient, but also given a particular 
meaning and assigned a particular interpretation (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004 p. 367). 
First level agenda setting influences what one thinks about, whereas second level 
agenda setting influences how one thinks about it.  
Researchers have demonstrated the importance of first and second level agenda 
setting across a number of empirical settings including social protest groups (McLeod & 
Hertog 1992), political election campaigns (Golan & Wanta, 2001; Wanta, Golan, & 
Lee, 2004), foreign nations (Kiousis & Wu, 2008), and specific issues, such as judicial 
restoration in Pakistan (Sadaf, 2011). These studies utilize different approaches. In 
relation to protest groups, McLeod & Hertog (1992) established that media coverage 
can influence public perceptions of social protest groups through micro-descriptive and 
macro-conceptual level analysis of the depictions of public opinion. They have focused 
on public opinion of particular individuals such as presidential candidates (Golan & 
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Wanta, 2001) and of groups such as social movements (Sadaf 2011; McLeod & Hertog 
1992). Sadaf (2011), for instance, found that public perception was highly affected by 
the favorable prominence newspapers gave to the issue of judicial restoration through 
survey data. 
Expanding upon these approaches, my research will focus upon examining the 
manner in which the media depicts the political corruption scandals in Brazil. I will 
conduct a coded analysis of news stories from mainstream Brazilian media outlets, and 
identify how those depictions influence public opinion. As noted above, research 
indicates that the public will often turn to media to understand especially complex 
matters with which they have limited day-to-day interactions. Although many 
Brazilians have first-hand experience with low-level corruption, they generally have 
little contact with the type of grand corruption represented in the Mensalão and 
Petrobras scandals, the majority of material informing the public on the situation – who 
is involved, how, and why - coming from the news. News plays an informative role by 
providing details of the scandals, tracking the progression of the trial process, and 
which politicians, companies, or political parties are involved. But the above literature 
also suggests that the media may play an additional analytical role in which they frame 
the corruption and relevant players in ways that have an effect on public opinion. 
Critically, the media may influence who is considered “guilty” or “innocent,” and who 
is to be held to account for corruption. Thus, it is important to consider which aspects 
the media focuses upon, what elements are left out, the angle in which the story is 
covered and the biases that are portrayed.     
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The existing literature suggests that the media will be likely to play an important 
first level and second level agenda setting role across both scandals under analysis.  
Indeed, the literature suggests that the media is consistently undertaking both roles.  
Because of this basic assumption, however, potential variation in the levels/extent and 
the kinds of agenda setting that news outlets undertake is ignored and therefore 
unexplored. The literature focuses more upon how agenda setting and framing theory 
function, but does not elaborate when or under what conditions these processes are most 
likely to occur and to have a significant impact on public opinion in the face of other 
competing factors that are also likely to have an effect.  
Case Studies  
The corruption case studies that I have selected offer the opportunity to explore 
the variation in different types of corruption, economic climate, and first and second 
level agenda setting and thus to fill the gaps in the existing literature and research. My 
comparison will focus on two of Brazil’s most recent political corruption scandals. The 
first, Mensalão or “big monthly allowance” was a vote buying scheme in which 
members of Congress were paid monthly bribes in order to form a coalition with the 
governing party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores – Worker’s Party (PT). This came to 
light in 2005, during president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s (Lula) first term, when it was 
discovered that the PT had been paying several congressmen 30,000 reais a month (the 
equivalent of $12,000), to form congressional allies and support PT’s legislative 
agenda. The situation became public in a newspaper interview with the president of an 
allied party, and shortly thereafter security camera tapes were leaked depicting 
politicians stuffing large stacks of cash into their suit pockets. The situation resulted in a 
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federal investigation where several powerful politicians were convicted. Although Lula 
was also investigated, no evidence that he was directly involved was uncovered and he 
was ultimately not implicated in the scheme. The subsequent public reaction 
encompassed utter disillusionment that a corruption scandal of this magnitude had 
occurred in Brazil. The discontent, however, was mainly directed towards frustration 
with the scandal itself, and did not concentrate the blame solely on Lula.  
The second case, the Petrolão, was discovered in 2014 during Dilma Rousseff’s 
presidency and is the largest corruption scandal in Brazilian history, involving high 
profile politicians and business elites. At the center of the scandal lies Petrobras, 
Brazil’s national oil company that provides much of the nation’s economic growth. The 
scandal consists of the irregular bidding process for government contracts, where heads 
of large construction companies formed an illegal alliance to gain overvalued Petrobras 
contracts via kickbacks, laundered through offshore accounts and worth millions of 
reais. This case occasioned a still ongoing mass federal investigation termed lava jato 
or “operation car wash,” that has convicted several of Brazil’s top businessmen and 
politicians. Much suspicion arose surrounding Dilma’s role in the events mainly 
because she was president of the Petrobras board during this time, yet evidence so far 
does not prove that she was directly involved. 
Both cases differ in relation to the type of corruption, economic context the 
country faced, how the press covered them, and the different reactions elicited in terms 
of presidential approval. During the Mensalão scandal (which involved bribery to form 
a political coalition), Brazil was experiencing rapid economic growth due to high 
commodity prices and increasing demand from China for Brazilian exports. Though the 
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scandal elicited mass media coverage, social mobilization was minimal. Public 
dissatisfaction was targeted mainly towards the inherent weaknesses in Brazil’s multi-
party system, but did not extend completely towards Lula. He was not implicated in the 
scheme and his public image remained relatively unscathed. He was re-elected for a 
second term the following year, and left office with an 80% approval rating. 
Speculations exist surrounding the possibility that he will run for President in 2018 
(although this prospect is becoming less likely).  
In contrast, during the Petrolão scandal (which involved kickbacks and money 
laundering from illicit government contracts), Brazil began experiencing a severe 
economic crisis characterized by high inflation, high unemployment, and a deep 
recession. The scandal drew immense public outrage, which manifested in large-scale 
protests. Dilma was at the center of the scandal, due to her association with Petrobras. 
Although she has also not been implicated in the ongoing investigation, her popularity 
has been dramatically affected, decreasing to just 8%. In conjunction with other factors, 
the scandal also contributed to her recent removal from office through impeachment on 
31 August 2016. 
In order to further understand the nature of the corruption scandals, I will 
present the main impacts that the scandals propagated. One of the main pieces of 
legislation passed during the period of the Mensalão was Lei 10.836, approved on 
January 9th 2004, which established the Bolsa Familia program (Civil, 2004). 
Considered one of the greatest feats of Lula’s government, the conditional cash transfer 
program aimed to end the cycle of poverty. Bolsa Familia provides families of low 
socioeconomic background a stipend for their children to attend school and receive 
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regular health checkups. The program was widely successful and more than halved 
extreme poverty from 9.7% to 4.3% of the population (Wetzel, 2013). A similar model 
has also been adopted in other nations.   
Since Brazil is a nation that struggles with extremely high levels of poverty and 
inequality, the assumption is that the intentions of the legislation to push forward a 
social agenda for the benefit of the population may contribute to shaping how the public 
accepts the scandal. This is directly reflected in Lula’s support base, as the majority is 
made up of low income Brazilians who benefit from the Bolsa Familia program. The 
program benefited approximately 45 million Brazilians, or 25% of the population and 
so was instrumental in shaping Lula’s voter support group (Levitsky, 2011).  
On the other hand, the Petrolão scandal had a directly negative impact upon 
social wellbeing. The Petrolão corruption scandal involved much larger sums of 
money: the bribes paid in the Mensalão scandal amount to about R$ 100 million (USD 
$43 million) (Antunes, 2013), whereas so far investigators have uncovered around R$ 
6.2 billion (USD $3 billion) in bribes paid during the Petrolão (Leahy, 2016). As new 
information continually surfaces the latter number continues to increase.  
The scandal had tremendous negative implications for Petrobras as a company, 
as it was downgraded by all three major rating agencies thus deterring its investment 
capabilities. In addition to Petrobras, all the major construction companies in Brazil are 
implicated in the scheme including Odebrecht, OAS, Camargo Corrêa and Andrade 
Gutierrez. Also, the international implications that the Petrolão encompasses are much 
more explicit. For example, Odebrecht, one of the main construction companies 
involved in the schemes has operations not only in Brazil, but also across Latin America 
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and in some African nations. The investigations revealed financial networks involving 
shell companies and various banks to transition more than $788 million dollars in bribes 
to corrupt leaders, political parties, and government officials in Angola, Mozambique, 
Argentina, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, and Venezuela (TI, 2016, p. 2). This means that the scandal transcends national 
boundaries, in contrast to the Mensalão that was confined mostly within the Brazilian 
Congress. The scandal also negatively impacted society as thousands of workers were 
laid off. A worker at the refinery construction site at Itaboraí laments: “Those 
responsible have forgotten that there is a whole nation dependent on this industry. They 
should pay, but we are the ones who are suffering. We are the ones losing our jobs. We 
are the ones struggling to pay for bread and milk for our children” (Watts, 2015). These 
implications may point to higher levels of acceptance for the first scandal, and stronger 
levels of resentment and rejection for the second scandal.  
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Chapter 3: Methods  
My investigation consists of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
I first conducted an extensive literature review on previous academic studies regarding 
corruption in Brazil, focusing on public perceptions and media influence. I utilized 
databases such as Academic Search Premier, JSTOR, and Google Scholar for key terms 
such as “typologies of corruption,” “economy and public opinion,” “agenda-setting 
theory,” and “corruption scandals in Brazil.” I also searched through the papers that 
were cited in the studies relevant to my study, expanding the scope of research.   
I then carried out quantitative assessments of public opinion trends overtime 
through public opinion survey data collected from a variety of sources including: the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Latinobarómetro - Opinión Pública 
Latinoamericana, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 
World Bank Country Surveys and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Instituto 
Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadística (IBGE), and Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião 
Pública e Estadística (IBOPE), and Datafolha. These sources consist of a combination 
of U.S., international, and Brazilian databases in order to overcome biases associated 
with any particular source. The CPI consists of the opinions of those connected to 
business in Brazil, whereas LAPOP and Latinobarómetro focuses upon the perspectives 
of ordinary Brazilian citizens, thus my data will encompass perspectives from various 
demographics.  
I also conducted a content analysis of news media in process tracing of historical 
events. Content analysis involves coding, a process that categorizes passages of text 
based on common themes drawn from multiple texts. These commonalities are then 
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“coded” or labeled and can be compared and analyzed later on. Codes can be based on 
keywords, terms, phrases, ideas, concepts, or topics found within the data, and can 
facilitate drawing patterns from multiple texts. In this manner, qualitative data from the 
news articles can be converted into quantitative data for the purposes of data analysis.  
I analyzed and coded 132 articles from Folha de São Paulo, one of Brazil’s top 
media outlets, regarding coverage of the Mensalão and Petrolão corruption scandals. 
Folha de São Paulo is considered a center-left news source, founded in 1921, with 
average circulation numbers around 320,740 copies. The articles were compiled through 
Factiva, a global news database owned by Dow Jones and Company. Since the Factiva 
database does not categorize articles based upon type, my sample consists of a variety 
of  different formats including political news articles, opinion editorials, and letters to 
the editor.  
In terms of total coverage of the Mensalão scandal, the number of published 
articles containing with the keywords “mensalão” and “corrupção” (corruption in 
Portuguese) was 3,184, ranging from 2005 to 2017 (see Fig. 1). I focused upon the two 
peak years of coverage: 2005, the year in which the scandal was revealed to the press, 
and 2012, the year in which the trial for those implicated in the scheme began. During 
those two years there were 1,341 total articles published with my keywords, 775 from 
2005 and 566 from 2012. I used a random sampling technique to select the specific 
articles for my analysis. I read 5% of the articles (67 in total). In my sample there were 
39 articles from 2005, and 28 from 2012. In order to ensure randomness and unbiased 
selection I consistently chose every 20th text beginning from the fourth article (the 
number 4 was based upon a random dice roll). 
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Figure 1: Mensalão Coverage Distribution in the Media by Year (2005 – 2017). Graph 
taken from: (Factiva Database, 2017).  
This graph represents the yearly news media distribution of articles with the key words 
“mensalão” and “corrupção” from January 1, 2005 till February 13, 2017. Peak years 
of coverage were 2005 and 2012, the years utilized in my analysis.   
For the second case, the total coverage of the Petrolão corruption scandal containing the 
keywords “corrupção and “lava jato” was 2,425 articles ranging from 2014 to 2017. 
The two years of peak coverage were 2015 and 2016. During those two years there were 
2,137 total articles published with my keywords, 1,117 from 2015 and 1,020 from 2016 
(Fig. 2). Since the total number of articles published related to the Lava Jato was 
considerably higher, and in order to keep the sample sizes similar, I selected 3% of the 
articles (65 in total). In my sample there were 35 articles from 2015 and 32 from 2016. 
Again, I randomly selected the articles, choosing every 33rd article beginning from the 
9th text (the number 9 was based upon another random dice roll). 
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Figure 2: Petrolão Coverage Distribution in the Media by Year (2014 – 2017). Graph 
taken from: (Factiva Database, 2017).  
 This graph represents the yearly news media distribution of articles with the key words 
“lava jato” and “corrupção” from January 1, 2014 till February 13, 2017. Peak years of 
coverage were 2015 and 2016, and comprise the focus of my analysis.   
I focused upon four main categories for my content analysis: 1) the depiction of Lula 
and Dilma as either positive, negative, or neutral; 2) the depiction of the corruption 
scandal as an isolated incident or within a systemic environment; 3) the evaluation of 
the investigation procedure and the trial; and 4) an overall assessment of the economic, 
political, institutional and social impact of the scandals.  
The manner in which I classified the tone of the media coverage is based off of 
the categories described by Valencia (2010), and defined as follows; I classified 
positive tone as whether the politician, institution, or organization was described 
favorably through the use of positive terms/statements/traits or if the actions of the 
subject were related to success. Following the same pattern, I classified negative tone as 
whether the politician, institution, or organization was described unfavorably through 
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the use of negative terms/statements/traits or when the actions of the subject were 
criticized or related to failure. Neutral coverage was classified if there was evidence of 
an equal mix between favorable and unfavorable coverage within the article, or if there 
was no apparently strong inclination either way.  
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Chapter 4: Findings  
Type of Corruption Findings  
Corruption is considered a major issue within the Brazilian public’s perception. 
Public opinion survey data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 
and Latinobarómetro - Opinión Pública Latinoamericana indicate that respondents 
from Brazil consistently rank corruption as one of the greatest problems the country 
faces. In 2015 Latinobarómetro respondents indicated that corruption was the top 
problem the nation faced, as 22.5% of respondents ranked corruption as the greatest 
problem in Brazil, followed by public health (16.8%) and public safety/violence (8.7%) 
(Fig. 3). Similarly, LAPOP survey data reveals that in 2014, 12.41% of respondents 
ranked corruption as the most serious issue that Brazil faces. In this survey corruption 
comes in third place overall, surpassed by public health/a lack of healthcare services 
(25.63%) and violence (19.59%). In addition, Brazilian public opinion data from 
Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística (IBOPE) reveals that in 2016, 
corruption was the second most important issue for 32% of respondents (Fig. 4). These 
measures of public opinion establish that the Brazilian public perceives corruption in 
general as a major issue that must be dealt with, though these surveys do not distinguish 
between different types of corruption.   
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Figure 3: Latinobarómetro Public Opinion Data 2015. Graph taken from: 
(Latinobarómetro Database, 2015).  
Public opinion survey responses to the question: "En su opinión, ¿Cuál considera Ud. 
que es el problema más importante en el país?" <In your opinion, what do you consider 
to be the most important problem in the country? From left to right the column 
categories can be translated as follows: low wages, instability in employment, inflation, 
violation of human rights, health problems, corruption, public security, consumption of 
drugs, political situation, the economy/economic/financial problems, global warming, 
other, no response.> Note that corruption was the top issue (22.5%).      
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Figure 4: IBOPE Public Opinion Data 2016. Graph taken from: (IBOPE Inteligência 
Database, 2017).  
Public opinion survey responses to the question: In your opinion, what do you consider 
to be the most important problem in the country? From top to bottom the row categories 
can be translated as follows: unemployment, corruption, health, public 
security/violence, low wages, drugs, quality of education, high interest rates, 
drought/lack of water, poverty/hunger. Note that corruption was the second top issue 
(32%). 
After an extensive investigation into videos and images of demonstrations, slogans, and 
signs, it is evident that the protestors who wish to see Dilma impeached and Lula sent to 
prison do not distinguish between different “types” of corruption within the framework 
of the two corruption scandals. Instead, protestors reveal frustration and anger with the 
repeated patterns of corruption that permeate the Brazilian government encompassing 
the most powerful political and business elites. Protestors demand an end to high-level 
corruption in general. They implore that the government invest in education and 
healthcare instead. Most protestors group Lula, Dilma, and the PT into a single 
category, for example, at an anticorruption rally a sign reads “We want the whole 
workers party in Jail!!!” (Ruptly, 2016). Similarly, another protestor proclaims: 
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“Estamos lutando pros nossos direitos contra o Mensalão, contra o Petrolão, contra o 
Lula ladrão, contra a Dilma, contra o Cunha, contra o Maranhão, salve o Brasil, 
revolução paulista.” <We are fighting for our rights against the Mensalão against the 
Petrolão against Lula the thief, against Dilma, against Cunha and against Maranhão> 
(Ruptly, 2016). Other protestors call for Dilma’s impeachment chanting “Fora Dilma!” 
<Out Dilma!> (Financial Times, 2016). Some demonstrators even demand military 
intervention. Lastly, the protestors clearly support the investigation as an image depicts 
“In Moro We Trust” and another states: “I am against corruption in the country and in 
favor of Judge Sergio Moro and of justice” (Financial Times, 2016). 
In contrast, those that support Lula and Dilma wear red clothing to manifest 
their solidarity with the PT political party. Demonstrators chant in support of Lula: “Ole 
ole ole ola Lula Lula” and “Lula guerreiro do povo brasileiro” <Lula, warrior of the 
Brazilian people> (AP, 2016). The impeachment is referred to as the manifestation of a 
coup and anti-impeachment demonstrators chant “Não vai ter golpe” <There won’t be a 
coup> (AP, 2016). A pro-Dilma demonstrator points out the absurdity of military 
intervention: “A gente passou 21 anos em ditadura e as pessoas que estão ai gritando 
querendo impeachment eu acho que não estudaram historia, não tem noção do que estão 
querendo.” <We spent 21 years under a dictatorship, those that are crying for 
impeachment haven’t studied history, they have no idea what they are asking for> (AP, 
2016).  
Overall, the discourse of the protestors is highly divided between those that 
support Dilma and Lula and those that oppose them. Both sides wish to see an end to 
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political corruption in Brazil, though there is generally a lack of distinction between the 
different types of corruption that the scandals entail.   
Economic Climate and Public Opinion Findings 
The economic situation in Brazil differed significantly during the two corruption 
scandals (Fig. 5). During the Mensalão, Brazil was undergoing a phase of rapid 
economic growth. In 2004 Brazil’s GDP grew by 5.2% (Santos, 2005). Brazil’s 
economic growth continued throughout the mid 2000’s and the nation was able to 
endure the global financial crisis relatively unscathed. This economic success was 
heavily influenced by changes in Brazilian economic policy and fiscally prudent 
measures. As shown in figure 6, Brazil also benefited from strong demand from China 
for key commodity exports such as iron ore, soybeans, and sugar (ECB, 2016). In 
addition, the real, the Brazilian currency, grew to maintain a high value on the 
international market, and inflation levels were controlled (Pereira, 2005).  
 
Figure 5: World Bank Data Brazilian GDP. Graph taken from: (“Brazil - World Bank 
Data,” 2017).  
Brazilian GDP growth trends from 1982 to 2015. Note the GDP growth beginning in 
2002 through 2011, and decline around 20014.      
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Figure 6: European Central Bank Data Brazilian Commodity Prices. Graph taken from: 
(European Central Bank (ECB) Economic Bulletin, 2016).    
Brazilian GDP growth and major export commodity prices from 2000 through 2014. 
Note the prices (especially iron ore) steadily increase in the mid 2000’s and drop 
sharply in 2014. 
This economic success did not last, however, and around 2015 Brazil began to 
experience a severe economic crisis and a deep recession. According to the World 
Bank, the nation’s growth rate decelerated from an annual growth rate of 4.5% between 
2006 and 2010, to 2.1% between 2011 and 2014. In addition, the GDP contracted by 
3.8% in 2015. The economy crisis encompassed a fall in commodity prices, and the 
inability to establish policy adjustments, which undermined trust with consumers and 
investors (“Brazil”, 2017). In addition, in 2015 Brazil experienced 10% inflation. When 
commodity prices fell in 2011, the impact on revenue from exports was significant as 
iron ore accounts for 13% of total exports and raw sugar accounts for 5% (ECB, 2016). 
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As growth declined, other structural weaknesses were highlighted in the economy, 
including a burdensome tax system, a large informal sector, poor infrastructure, lack of 
competition, the high costs of launching a business, and high tariff rates (ECB, 2016.)  
In addition, total investment declined by 6% on average since 2014.  Petrobras had to 
cut investments by 33% in 2014 and 2015 due to the corruption scandal and to adjust to 
lower oil prices. This is significant because Petrobras accounts for 10% of total 
Brazilian investments and almost 2% of the nation’s GDP (ECB, 2016).  
Brazilian public opinion data encompassing perceptions of the economy match 
the trends reflected in the economy and the subsequent public backlash against the 
corruption scandals. During the Mensalão scandal and trial, the Datafolha public 
opinion survey data supports my hypothesis that the public did not have a strong 
negative reaction to the corruption scandal in part because it did not view the economy 
as a major issue. In 2005 at the onset of the scandal, Brazilians maintained positive 
attitudes regarding the state of the economy. Most respondents (46%) considered that 
the economic situation would not change, and more respondents believed that the 
national economic scenario would improve (40%) than deteriorate (12%) (Datafolha, 
2005). Similarly, the majority of Brazilians did not believe that the economy was a 
major issue that Brazil faced. In 2009, nearing the end of the Lula administration and 
before the Mensalão trial, a survey reveals that the least amount of citizens perceived 
the economy (2%) and inflation (1%) to be crucial problems (Datafolha, 2009). 
Brazilians also maintained that Lula managed the economy well. In 2010, when asked 
which areas the Lula government managed best, economic performance was the second 
most cited category (at 13%), followed by employment (at 10%), where the top area 
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was issues related to hunger and misery (19%) (Datafolha, 2010). In addition, economic 
performance was not cited among the worst areas of the Lula administration; instead 
health, public safety, education, and corruption (6%) were the worst performing areas 
(Datafolha, 2010).  
This means that citizens were content with Lula’s social spending initiatives 
such as Bolsa Familia, which contributed to the drastic decrease in extreme poverty 
rates in Brazil. The state of the economy was not perceived as a significant issue to the 
general public, as it was not on the list of top issues the country faced, and was instead 
the second area that the Lula government was perceived to have managed best. This 
may explain why backlash against the first corruption scandal was limited, as the public 
opinion data confirms that the general public perception was satisfaction with the state 
of the economy and with the Lula government’s management of the economy. 
For the second corruption case, the Datafolha public opinion survey data also 
supports my hypothesis that the public viewed the economy pessimistically during the 
Petrolão scandal and the Lava Jato investigation. At the onset of the Petrolão scandal 
in 2014, citizens were pessimistic about the country’s economy. The majority of 
Brazilians believed that the economic situation would worsen (36%), and more believed 
that the economy would remain the same (32%) than improve (25%) (Datafolha, 2014). 
As the economic crisis worsened in 2015, Brazilians continued to view the economy in 
a negative manner. The majority remained pessimistic about the country’s economic 
situation, as well as personal and macroeconomic aspects such as unemployment, 
purchasing power, and inflation (Datafolha, 2015). The number of Brazilians who 
believed that the economic situation would worsen increased to the majority of 60%, 
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whereas the percentage of respondents who believed the economy would improve or 
remain the same both dropped to 15% and 23% respectively (Datafolha, 2015). 
Similarly, in 2016, pessimism with micro and macroeconomic issues also increased 
(Datafolha, 2016). In addition, a 2016 IBOPE public opinion survey data reveals that 
unemployment was viewed as the most important issue Brazil faced by 43% of 
respondents (IBOPE, 2017). In a 2015 IBOPE survey, the majority of respondents 
(62%) believed that Dilma’s management of the government was bad or terrible 
(IBOPE, 2015). In addition, another 2015 IBOPE survey links the deteriorating state of 
the economy to corruption. The survey reveals that 87% of respondents believed that 
Brazil was facing an economic crisis. The main reasons cited were an increase in prices 
or inflation (56%), and the second main reason was corruption (34%), followed by 
increasing interest rates (28), unemployment (8%) and the raising value of the dollar 
(5%) (IBOPE, 2015). 
This dissatisfaction with the state of the economy during the second corruption 
scandal means that Brazilians in general were dissatisfied with Dilma’s management of 
the economy, and experienced anxiety regarding financial insecurity and fear that the 
economic climate would continue to worsen. The deteriorating state of the economy 
was thus perceived as an important issue in Brazilian public opinion. This increased 
anxiety and fear may contribute to explaining why backlash against the second 
corruption scandal occurred on an extremely large scale, as the public opinion data 
confirms that the general attitude was one of dissatisfaction with the state of the 
economy and with the Dilma government’s management of economic affairs; the blame 
for the economic crisis was partially placed on corruption.  
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Examples of protest slogans that reference the economy include: “Queremos 
emprego e salario digno” <We want a job and a living wage> and “Não faltam médicos, 
faltam condições de trabalho digno” <There is not a lack of doctors, there is a lack of 
decent working conditions> (Faria, 2013). These slogans demonstrate Brazilian 
citizens’ discontent with the economic climate and the resulting job insecurity and poor 
working conditions that they experienced.    
The section above centered upon the direct effects of the economy on public 
opinion; I will be discussing the economy’s indirect effects on public opinion through 
the media in the next section. 
Media Content Analysis Findings   
The media content analysis focused upon four main areas: 1) the depiction the 
key political figures; 2) the depiction of the corruption scandals; 3) the evaluation of the 
investigation procedure and the trial; and 4) an overall assessment of the impacts of the 
scandals. 
Depiction of Key Political Figures 
For the first area of focus in the content analysis (see Figs. 7 & 8) I found that 
slightly more articles overall reference Lula surrounding the Mensalão scandal (48%), 
than mention Dilma regarding the Petrolão scandal (42%). In relation to their respective 
corruption cases, Lula is depicted positively slightly more often during the Mensalão (in 
19% of articles) than is Dilma during the Petrobras scandal (in 15% of articles). 
However, negative coverage of Dilma was much more common in coverage of the 
Petrobras scandal (63% of articles) than negative coverage of Lula in coverage of the 
Mensalão scandal (31% of articles). Half of the articles from the Mensalão scandal that 
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mentioned Lula depicted him in a neutral light, whereas only 22% of Petrobras articles 
mentioning Dilma depicted her neutrally.  
 
Figure 7: Folha Depiction of Lula and the Mensalão 
 
Figure 8: Folha Depiction of Dilma and the Petrolão 
Positive Coverage of Key Political Figures 
Positive coverage of Lula and Dilma centers mainly on how corruption is 
addressed in their respective governments and on the demonstrations in their support. 
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The most prominent manner in which the corpus depicts Lula, is as a mediator between 
key groups addressing the issue of corruption within his government. For example, he 
has a direct relationship with the masses through institutional mediations via the 
National Congress (Vianna, 2005), he acts as bridge between other left wing Latin 
American governments and leaders (Seabra, 2005), and he also meets with prominent 
social movements such as the Landless Workers Movement (MST) and labor union 
leaders (Scolese & Duailibi, 2005). Similarly, positive coverage praises Dilma’s 
measures to combat corruption. For example, Dilma presented an anticorruption 
proposal to Congress (“Presidente,” 2015), and permitted the investigations to proceed 
freely without utilizing her power to interfere (Painel, 2015). In relation to popular 
support, positive coverage of Dilma reports on rallies where demonstrators protest 
against her impeachment (Costa, 2016; Haubert, 2016). Similarly, positive coverage of 
Lula reports on manifestations that are composed of leftist intellectuals who express 
their support for Lula, though they are dissatisfied with his government (Marreiro, 
2005). In both cases, the number of articles depicting popular support among the public 
is limited.  
Negative coverage of Key Political Figures 
In both cases, negative coverage of leaders entailed reporting on anti corruption 
protests and the respective president’s diminishing popularity, though these aspects are 
much more developed in the Petrolão articles. To present Lula’s decreasing popularity, 
Folha cites public opinion polls showing distrust in government institutions (Moisés, 
2005), and depicts Lula losing public support: “O presidente deve ter percebido que 
quem torce pelo Brasil não torce mais por este governo.” <The president must have 
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realized that those who root for Brazil no longer root for this government> (“Painel,” 
2005). Similarly, Folha conveys the precarious nature of Dilma's government, reporting 
that her support base is disintegrating and that the government is unstable and 
unpopular: “Desde os protestos de março, o governo nunca pareceu tão frágil, e o 
desfecho da crise, tão incerto.” <Since the March protests, the government has never 
seemed so fragile, and the outcome of the crisis, so uncertain> (Franco, 2015).  
In relation to demonstrations, negative coverage of Lula describes small scale 
protests in Rio and Porto Alegre against corruption in Lula’s government. One of the 
signs reads: "Lula, de orgulho a vergonha nacional" <Lula, from pride to national 
shame> (“Atos,” 2005). In contrast, coverage of anti Dilma demonstrations is much 
more developed, as there are several articles that report on protests across Brazil and 
even abroad. This includes massive anti corruption protests that occurred across 26 
states in Brazil (Gullar, 2015), including Brasilia, the capital, supporting the 
impeachment process against Dilma, with participation of movements such as Vem Pra 
Rua, Nas Ruas and Limpa Brasil (Costa, 2016). As another example, Brazilians united 
in front of the Brazilian consulate in Washington DC to protest against Dilma's 
government, Lula and the PT (Ninio, 2016).  
In addition, negative coverage encompasses criticisms of Lula, Dilma, and the 
PT. Folha criticizes Lula for defending corrupt politicians (“Lula,” 2005), and accuses 
the PT of attempting to distract attention away from the Mensalão by drawing attention 
to another corruption scandal called Caso Cachoeira (Ombudsman & Singer, 2012). In 
contrast, negative coverage of Dilma centers on criticizing her for incompetence. For 
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example, a letter to the editor complaints that Dilma is incapable and had ruined the 
economy, and stated that the political crisis was only “temporary” (“Painel,” 2015). 
Neutral Coverage of Key Political Figures  
The main feature encompassing Lula’s neutral coverage surrounds the question 
of whether or not he knew about the “monthly allowance” corruption scheme within his 
ruling coalition. Either he had been aware of the plan and was now lying about not 
having prior knowledge of the situation, or he had truly been oblivious to the vast 
corruption scheme in which his political party played a central role. In this debate, more 
articles point to Lula knowing about the situation than not knowing. The main sources 
that insinuate that Lula knew are quotes from politicians of the then opposition party 
PSDB, and letters to the editor. On the other hand, Roberto Jefferson (PTB), the whistle 
blower of the Mensalão scandal is the main proponent supporting the notion that Lula 
did not know about the scheme. Folha relays: “Jefferson mantém a versão de que o ex-
presidente Lula não sabia do esquema de compra de apoio a seu governo no Congresso” 
<Jefferson maintains the version that former President Lula did not know about the 
scheme to buy support for his government in Congress> (“Foi,” 2015). 
In contrast, neutral coverage of Dilma does not point so directly to the question 
of whether she knew about the corruption scandal or not. Instead, the coverage centers 
on describing her impeachment proceedings and the politicians close to Dilma that are 
under investigation for involvement in the corruption scheme (Carvalho, 2016; 
“Investigação,” 2016). For example, news updates on the impeachment proceedings 
include: “OAB (Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil) usará dados da Lava Jato para definir 
 
 
42  
posição sobre impeachment.” <OAB (Brazil’s National Attorneys Association) will use 
the Lava Jato data to define their position on the impeachment> (“PF investiga,” 2015). 
In addition, some anti corruption manifestations related to the Mensalão also 
appear in neutral coverage as they are not directly against Lula. For example, a 
demonstrator states: “Essa manifestação não é a favor nem contra Lula. O que sabemos 
é que precisamos construir uma nova alternativa...Brasil sem exclusão, injustiça e 
Mensalão.” <This demonstration is not for or against Lula. What we do know is that we 
need to build a new alternative ... Brazil without exclusion, injustice and Mensalão> 
(“Em São Paulo,” 2005). In contrast, however, I could not find any coverage of 
manifestations related to Dilma that could be considered neutral during the period 
examined, as coverage of protests against the Petrolão is either clearly pro or anti 
Dilma.  
Depiction of the Corruption Scandals  
The second section comprises depictions of the scandals (Figs. 9 & 10). For both 
cases, the vast majority of the corpus depicts the scandal as occurring within an 
environment of systemic corruption (Mensalão 84% and Petrolão 97%). Coverage of 
the Mensalão also presented other alternatives in which 7% portray the scandal as new 
or unique, 7% call on historical roots to explain the scandal, and 2% point to human 
nature as a cause of corruption. On the other hand, in the case of the Petrolão, historical 
roots of corruption was the only other factor mentioned, by 3% of articles.  
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Figure 9: Folha Depiction of the Mensalão Corruption Scandal 
 
Figure 10: Folha Depiction of the Petrolão Corruption Scandal 
The vast majority of articles in both cases portray the scandal as occurring within a 
system riddled with corruption. This systemic corruption refers to a situation in which 
the major state institutions are routinely dominated and utilized by corrupt individuals 
and groups. In the Mensalão case, the political system is depicted as the institution that 
is consistently dominated by corrupt individuals and groups, as the scheme reaches 
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across Congress implicating several politicians of various political parties. The main 
characteristic that creates the impression that corruption is systemic in Brazil is that 
many articles also reference other corruption schemes, such as: Caso Cachoeira 
(“FHC,” 2012; Ombudsman & Singer, 2012), regional corruption schemes (Rocha, 
2012), corruption in the telecommunications sector (Carazzai, 2016), irregularities with 
campaign financing and Caixa 2 tax evasion (Ceneviva, 2005; Suwwan, 2005), Caso 
dos Correios (“Fazendo escola,” 2005; “A culpa,” 2005; Guerra, 2012; “Eunício,” 
2005;  “Delcidio,” 2005; “Contei,” 2005), Operação Uruguay 2 (Bragon, 2005), 
Operação Anaconda and the selling of judicial sentences (“Juiz,” 2005), the formation 
of cartels in various industries (“SDE,” 2005), and the corruption that occurred during 
former President Collor’s government (Bezerra, 2005).  
Similarly to the Mensalão, the vast majority of the corpus of articles dealing 
with Petrolão points to pervasive systemic corruption. Like the first case, this 
perception is also created mainly due to references to numerous other corruption 
schemes including: Caso do triplex do Guaruja (“Moro, 2016), bribery to stop the 
investigations (Carazzai, 2016), Escandalo de Furnas (Falcão, 2016), and nine CPI’s 
set up to investigate corruption scandals in various sectors (“Congresso,” 2016). Other 
components that insinuate systemic corruption are descriptions of the various 
contracting companies involved in the scheme, the numerous politicians and 
businessmen under investigation, and the intricate web of money laundering through 
international banks.  
Another interesting example related to systemic corruption consists of 
references to the Mensalão scandal during the Petrolão. This occurs in different ways, 
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for example, to illustrate that corruption is pervasive across time as some politicians 
involved in the Mensalão are also involved in the Petrolão (“Gilmar,” 2016; “Ex-
deputado, 2015). One example in which the first scandal is mentioned in the context of 
the second scandal relates to public opinion, “O Mensalão já tinha chocado a opinião 
pública; agora, o escândalo do Petrolão, envolvendo propinas que chegam a centenas de 
milhões de reais, ultrapassou a capacidade de tolerância da opinião pública.” <"The 
Mensalão had already shocked public opinion; now the Petrolão scandal, involving 
bribes that amount to hundreds of millions of reais, has surpassed the capacity of the 
public opinion to tolerate> (Gullar, 2015). On the other hand, the Mensalão is also 
sometimes cited as an example of a past corruption scandal where politicians were 
eventually held accountable (“Dirceu,” 2015).  
Depiction of the Anticorruption Mechanisms  
The corpus tied to the Petrolão scandal focused more attention upon coverage of 
the investigation and trial procedure (75%) than the Mensalão corpus (52%) (Figs. 11 & 
12). For both cases, the majority of the articles paint the investigations and trial 
procedure in a positive manner, and in both cases a smaller percentage portray 
dissatisfaction or critique the punitive process. Positive coverage of the Lava Jato 
investigations (82%) is slightly greater than positive coverage of the Mensalão 
investigative proceedings (69%), and accordingly, critiques to the trial proceedings are 
slightly greater relating to the Mensalão (31%) than to the Lava Jato/Petrolão (18%).  
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Figure 11: Folha Depiction of the Mensalão Investigation and Trial  
 
Figure 12: Folha Depiction of the Petrolão Investigation and Trial 
Positive Coverage of the Investigations and Trial 
The main areas in which positive coverage of the Lava Jato and the Mensalão 
investigation and trial procedure converge are: Folha describes new evidence that has 
been uncovered, applauds quality investigative journalism, praises the transparency of 
the judges, particularly Sérgio Moro, head of the Lava Jato, informs that high profile 
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politicians and businessmen are being investigated for involvement in the corruption 
scheme, including Lula, Collor and Cunha, maintains that the procedure holds high 
profile politicians and businessmen accountable,  reports that politicians and 
businessmen are presenting their testimonies in court, and lastly describes the trial 
results and those who have been condemned. A prime example of trial approval is: “A 
comprovação de tantos fatos tão graves, envolvendo simultaneamente a cúpula 
econômica e política do país, é algo inédito na história.” <The substantiation of so many 
serious facts, involving simultaneously the economic and political elite of the country, 
is something unheard of in history> (Carvalho, 2015).  
The main areas in which positive coverage of the Lava Jato and the Mensalão 
investigation and trial procedure diverge are that the Petrolão corpus also applauds how 
the institutions such as CPIs’ (Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito: Parliamentary 
Inquiry Commission), PF (Polícia Federal: Brazilian Federal Police), STF (Supremo 
Tribunal Federal: Brazilian Supreme Court), the Lava Jato Task Force, MPF 
(Ministério Público Federal: Federal Public Prosecutor), AGU (Advocacia-Geral da 
União: Federal Attorney General),  are working together on the investigation, and how 
politicians and businessmen are cooperating with the investigations and providing 
information regarding others involved in the schemes. 
Negative Coverage of the Investigations and Trial 
Negative coverage of the investigations and trial procedures is significantly less 
common than positive coverage in both cases. The main recurring themes include: 
critiques of the Brazilian Federal Police (PF) in charge of the investigation by 
portraying them as inadequate, dissatisfaction with the punishments or lack thereof, and 
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complaints that the trial is progressing too slowly. In the case of the Lava Jato, in 
addition to the areas mentioned above, the corpus also presents criticisms regarding the 
lack of communication and cooperation between institutions involved in the 
investigations (Nery, 2015) and comparisons of the Lava Jato task force to the military 
dictatorship (“Foi,” 2015).  
Depiction of the Implications of the Corruption Scandals  
In the last section, overall, a greater number of Mensalão articles 61% present 
an analysis of the impacts of the corruption scandals, whereas in the Lava Jato corpus 
only 40% focus on this analysis (Figs. 13 & 14). Across both scandals, the area of 
greatest emphasis points to the implications that affect institutions (Mensalão 44% and 
Petrolão 42%). For the Mensalão, the second most discussed aspect is the resulting 
social impacts of the scandal (34%), whereas for the Petrolão scandal, the second most 
emphasized category relates to economic impact (31%). Articles focusing on the 
Mensalão scandal additionally point to political impact (7%) and ethical impact (3%), 
whereas the Lava Jato corpus does not.  
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Figure 13: Folha Depiction of the Impacts of the Mensalão Corruption Scandal  
 
Figure 14: Folha Depiction of the Impacts of the Petrolão Corruption Scandal  
Institutional Impact  
In relation to institutional impact (Figs. 15 & 16), a slightly greater percentage 
of Mensalão articles (61%) maintain that corruption threatens institutions, regime 
legitimacy, or democracy compared to Petrolão articles (54.4%). Conversely, a slightly 
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greater percentage of Petrolão articles (45.5%) maintain that democratic institutions are 
stable despite corruption, compared to the Mensalão (39%). 
 
Figure 15: Folha Depiction of the Institutional Impacts of the Mensalão  
 
Figure 16: Folha Depiction of the Institutional Impacts of the Petrolão  
Institutions are Stable Despite Corruption 
The notion that Brazilian democratic institutions are stable despite corruption 
during the Mensalão scandal is mostly based on the consistent perception that 
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politicians allegedly involved in the scheme are peacefully resigning from power and 
that the trials demonstrate the institutional strength and capacity of the judiciary and of 
Brazilian democracy, principally because the trial is setting a precedent to diminish 
impunity in Brazil. For example, statements about the Mensalão trial support the claim 
that the checks and balances within the democratic system are functioning: “Será um 
marco histórico que nos guindará a um novo patamar, o de país democrático onde as 
instituições funcionam. Instituições estas que se pautam por valores e que cobram de 
seus representantes a honradez de cumprir o que determina a Constituição. Esse é o 
legado que podemos deixar para o futuro.” <It will be a historical landmark that will 
bring us to a new level, that of a democratic country where institutions work. 
Institutions that are based on ethical values and that hold their representatives 
accountable to the honesty to comply with what the Constitution determines. This is the 
legacy that we can leave for the future> (Guerra, 2012).  
On the other hand, the perspective that democratic institutions are stable despite 
corruption during the Petrolão scandal is created mainly through depictions that the 
institutions are effectively collaborating together on the investigation and that 
politicians are being held accountable. For example, the head of the Lava Jato task 
force states in an interview: “Esse crescimento exponencial do caso decorreu, em boa 
medida, do emprego efetivo de colaborações premiadas pelo Ministério Público. Mas o 
sucesso também decorre da experiência, da qualidade técnica e da sinergia entre as 
equipes do Ministério Público, da Polícia Federal e da Receita que trabalham no caso, 
bem como da atuação firme e imparcial do Judiciário.” <This exponential growth in the 
case was largely due to the effective use of collaborations (plea bargains) awarded by 
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the Public Prosecution Service. But success also stems from the experience, technical 
quality and synergy between the Public Prosecution, Federal Police and IRS working on 
the case, as well as the firm and impartial performance of the Judiciary> (Carvalho, 
2015).  
Corruption Negatively Impacts Institutions  
For the Mensalão case, the main patterns that refer to corruption as a destabilizer 
consists of Folha citing members of the judiciary stating that corruption schemes are 
detrimental to democratic institutions (“Ministros,” 2012), and calling for political and 
legislative reforms, particularly related to problematic campaign financing and caixa 
dois, which facilitates tax evasion (Cony, 2012; Vianna, 2005; Ceneviva, 2005). In 
contrast, the reasoning behind how corruption threatens institutions, regime legitimacy, 
and democracy is much broader in the Petrolão case, and includes: references to 
Congress attempting to weaken the power of the judiciary, by diminishing their ability 
to investigate and blocking a package of measures from the Lava Jato task force 
(Bragon, 2016); questioning whether the judiciary can handle the investigations 
(Bergamo, 2015); questioning how Cunha is leading the impeachment process against 
Dilma, though he himself is under investigation for corruption and involvement in the 
Petrolão (Franco, 2015), complaints on how the protests have destabilized the 
government: “Desde os protestos de março, o governo nunca pareceu tão frágil, e o 
desfecho da crise, tão incerto.” <Since the March protests, the government never 
seemed so fragile, and the outcome of the crisis, so uncertain > (Franco, 2015); and 
comments on the urgency of reforms: “A Lava Jato até agora indignou, mas não 
transformou o país. Se queremos evitar que a história se repita, precisamos de mudanças 
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legislativas urgentes sobre o processo político e o sistema de Justiça criminal.” <Lava 
Jato so far has caused indignation, but has not transformed the country. If we want to 
prevent history from repeating itself, we need urgent legislative changes in the political 
process and the criminal justice system> (Carvalho, 2015).  
Economic Impact 
In relation to the effects of corruption on the economy (Figs. 17 & 18), the 
Petrolão corpus placed an emphasis on the economic impact more often (31% of 
articles) compared to the Mensalão corpus (12% of articles). Those writing about the 
economic impact of the Mensalão tend to emphasize that the economy is doing well 
despite corruption (60% of articles), while only 12.5% of articles on economic impact 
depicted the economy as withstanding the Petrolão scandal. On the other hand, a 
greater percentage of articles discussing the economy focus on how corruption 
negatively affects the economy in the Petrolão corpus (87.5%) compared to the 
Mensalão (40%). 
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Figure 17: Folha Depiction of the Economic Impacts of the Mensalão  
 
Figure 18: Folha Depiction of the Economic Impacts of the Petrolão  
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For the Mensalão corpus, examples of the impact of corruption on the Brazilian 
economy involve mostly positive coverage of measures taken by the finance minister 
and the president of the central bank to minimize the economic impacts of the 
corruption allegations, and the detrimental effect of corruption on attracting foreign 
investment. In contrast, for the Petrolão scandal, the discourse on the economic impact 
revolves mainly around how the situation affects Petrobras and the other contracting 
companies involved in the scheme. Only one article presents the economy as doing well 
despite the corruption scheme, where the president of Petrobras maintains that selling 
the company assets will improve the company governance and stabilize the situation 
(“Vitrines,” 2012). All other articles point to the detrimental effects that corruption 
poses for the economy. Coverage centers mostly upon Petrobras and how due to the 
corruption scandal and the Lava Jato investigation the oil company lost billions in 
revenue (Vettorazzo & Bercito, 2015), is losing its ability to conduct international 
business (Pamplona, 2016), lost stock value (Landim, Lima, & Nery 2015), and is 
forced to make cuts and fire workers (Pitombo, 2015). Other comments center on how 
the scandal ruins the reputation of several major contracting companies (“Três,” 2015), 
which impedes their ability to finance construction projects (Pamplona, 2016), and on 
how they lose share value after politicians and businessmen are arrested (“Dólar, 2015).  
Social Impact  
Lastly, the main pattern that emerged in both cases involving social impact is 
that societal resentment is fostered through the discourse that voters should feel 
betrayed because the government is stealing money from them, and that the money 
stolen must be returned. In the Mensalão articles, this pattern was often times 
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propagated through religious figureheads that speak on the importance of public 
engagement in demanding the end of corrupt practices. For the Petrolão, a similar 
attitude of discontent emerges, where common themes reported include insinuation that 
society must put pressure to impeach Dilma in order to rid the country of corruption, 
and that Brazilian citizens should know all the facts.  
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Chapter 5: Analysis  
Analysis of the Role of Economy and Public Opinion  
The results of my research indicate that there are two ways by which an 
economic downturn can affect public opinion in response to a corruption scandal. The 
first is that economic downturn makes citizens more critical of the government and 
more likely to blame politicians for corruption scandals in terms of approval ratings. 
And the second is that the media exacerbates the situation when it links an economic 
slowdown with the corruption scandal.  
The public opinion data revealed that during the Mensalão scandal, citizens did 
not view the economy as a major issue and were pleased with Lula’s management of the 
economy. In contrast during the Petrolão scandal, Brazilians were extremely concerned 
with the economic crisis and maintained negative perceptions of Dilma’s management 
of the economy, blaming corruption as one of the main reasons for the economic 
downturn. These observations support my hypothesis and are consistent with the 
existing literature when it states that public perceptions are impacted negatively during 
economy slowdown and positively during economic prosperity. The stage is set for the 
media to frame the situation.         
Similarly, the content analysis confirms my assumptions regarding the role of 
the economy in shaping perceptions about corruption because the results indicate that 
when the economy is doing well, the economic impact is not prominent on the media 
agenda, but when the economy is doing poorly, the economic impact becomes a more 
significant priority upon the media agenda.  
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The level of importance on the media agenda is evident as the Petrolão corpus 
placed a higher emphasis on discussing the economic impacts of the corruption scandal. 
This is achieved as a greater number of articles discuss this relationship: (Petrolão: 31% 
vs. Mensalão: 12%). In this sense, the media sets the agenda that the economy is an 
important factor related to the Petrobras scandal. On the other hand, since there are not 
many articles directly discussing the economy in relation to the Mensalão scandal, it 
can be concluded that the media is not setting the agenda for the public, thus indicating 
to readers that the economy was not a pressing concern generally. 
In terms of framing how the public should perceive the topic, during the 
Mensalão scandal the media frames the situation as positive. More articles (60%),  
maintain that posture because the economy is stable despite corruption, and only (40%) 
point to corruption as detrimental to the economy. In the Petrolão scandal the pattern is 
reversed, with 87.5% of the articles that mention the economy maintaining that there is 
a negative impact, and only 12.5% of the articles propose that the economy is doing 
well despite corruption. The fact that there is a greater divergence in positive versus 
negative views in the second case, and a more balanced distribution between positive 
and negative in the first case, also points to a greater significance of the economic 
impact as central to the discourse in times of economic downturn.  
Thus, these patterns confirm my previous assumptions that in a time of 
economic prosperity, the economy becomes less important when discussing issues of 
corruption and the two tend to be viewed as separate entities, whereas in times of 
economic misfortune, the discourse shifts to place a greater emphasis upon the 
detrimental impacts of corruption. The amount of emphasis and the type of perspective 
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propagated in turn impacts public opinion. Those who read the news in times of 
economic prosperity will internalize that corruption plays a minimal role in shaping the 
course of the economy, whereas in times of economic crisis, the discourse links the two 
together and the public will internalize that corruption holds tremendous detrimental 
impacts to the economy.  
In terms of the case studies, Brazil was experiencing an economic crisis during 
the Petrolão scandal, and the results indicate that greater emphasis was placed upon the 
negative effects of corruption on the economy. In contrast, the nation enjoyed economic 
stability and growth during the Mensalão scandal, and the results indicate that less 
emphasis was placed on the implications of corruption for the economy. When the 
economy was doing poorly, as during the second scandal, the economic impact becomes 
a greater focus of public opinion, whereas when the economy was doing well, as during 
the first scandal, the economic impact is less likely to be a central focus of public 
opinion.   
These relationships are intriguing because corruption is always detrimental to 
the economy. The link between corruption and the economy becomes more pronounced 
in the discourse when the country faces an economic crisis, but is neglected in favor of 
placing greater emphasis on other topics in times of economic growth. This process can 
be utilized to minimize the detrimental economic impact of corruption scandals in times 
of prosperity, or on the other hand, be overly exploited in times of economic crisis to 
overshadow other important factors such as the underlying causes behind corruption 
mechanisms.    
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Analysis of Coverage of Key Political Figures  
The media content analysis yielded mixed results regarding my original 
assumptions of the significance of the key political figures in conjunction with their 
respective corruption scandals. In terms of the depiction and perception of the 
presidential figures, the evidence suggests a significant impact in relation to framing 
theory through attribute setting but surprisingly, less of a presence of agenda setting 
theory because overall the percentage of articles that discuss the figures in relation to 
the scandals was not the majority.  
Lula was extremely popular during the first scandal and was elected to a second 
term even after the scandal broke. It was only after the trial started at a later date that 
public opinion from certain sectors of society began to turn against him. The media 
content analysis parallels this trend as there was more neutral and positive coverage 
combined than negative coverage. However, coverage was not as positive as I had 
expected, as there was more negative (31%) than positive coverage (19%). Dilma, on 
the other hand, was vastly unpopular when the second corruption scandal was revealed, 
and her popularity continued to decline until she was eventually impeached from office. 
The media content analysis also parallels this trend as the majority of her coverage was 
negative (63%), exceeding both positive (15%) and neutral (22%) coverage combined.  
In this sense, the news articles frame Lula more neutrally and Dilma more 
negatively. Neutral coverage is largely composed by the discourse of questioning 
whether Lula knew or did not know about the corruption scheme, which is more critical 
than inflammatory. On the other hand, Dilma is clearly framed as losing popular 
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support because of consistent reporting on the numerous protests calling for her 
impeachment, which is more inflammatory than critical.   
This confirms the notion that the media frames perceptions of Lula and Dilma 
that parallel the public opinion poll data reflecting presidential popularity or lack 
thereof. However what surprised me was the lack of agenda setting placing Lula and 
Dilma as central to the corruption scandals. The politicians are the focus of less than 
half of the articles analyzed for each respective scandal.  
The unexpected results from the content analysis suggest that the news articles 
do not set the agenda as prominently as I had anticipated, in the sense that overall 
coverage mentioning the presidential figures in relation to the corruption schemes do 
not appear as a vast majority in either case. Comparing the two figures, the media 
agenda sets Lula more prominently on the public agenda as being linked to the first 
corruption scheme, since 48% of the articles discuss him. The link between Dilma and 
the second scandal is slightly weaker and she is not set on the agenda as prominently, as 
a slightly smaller percentage of the articles (42%) discuss Dilma in relation to the 
Petrolão. 
Though I had hypothesized that in the public opinion both presidential figures 
would be perceived as central to the scandals, the media does not depict Dilma to be as 
strongly tied to the Petrobras scandal as they do with Lula in the face of the Mensalão 
scandal. For both cases this link is not as strong as I had anticipated, as I had assumed 
that the key politicians would appear much more prominently in the forefront of the 
discussion surrounding the corruption scandals.  
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Since the news articles do not set the agenda for Lula and Dilma as central to the 
corruption schemes, it can be concluded that other factors may have contributed more to 
determining the variation and nature of public backlash directed at these individuals 
than newspaper coverage, as I discuss below.  
Analysis of the Role of Type of Corruption  
The existing literature on corruption would classify the two scandals of interest 
as belonging to the same “type,” entailing grand, high level, political corruption that is 
systemic. I hypothesized that the media and popular discussions of the scandals would 
reveal that the public perceived them as distinct: whereas corruption associated with the 
Mensalão would be seen as corruption aimed at greasing the political wheels in 
Congress, the corruption associated with the Petrobras scandal would be seen as being 
more about personal enrichment. However, evidence from demonstrators, protests, and 
manifestations reveals that the public did not distinguish between different types of 
corruption. Instead demonstrators are fed up with corruption in Brazil in general, blame 
the situation on the political leaders, and demand an end to impunity, evident through 
cries for Dilma’s impeachment and Lula’s prison sentence. Thus, the different type of 
corruption involved in the two scandals does not help to explain the varying levels of 
public backlash. In relation to the news media content analysis, the articles revealed that 
both cases are described as occurring within an environment conducive to systemic 
corruption. Whereas in neither case the media portrayed the corruption as acceptable 
(generally or in the public’s view), the coverage did point to diverging intents of the 
corruption schemes.  
 
 
63  
The content analysis results indicate that the media depicts both cases as 
occurring within an environment of systemic corruption, due mainly to the numerous 
corruption schemes that appear either in conjunction to the main corruption scheme, or 
come to light as the investigation progresses. In both cases the discourse maintains that 
the scandal is unprecedented and is the biggest scandal in Brazilian history. 
The results also indicate a separation between different types of corruption, 
describing the first case as corruption for political purposes and the second case as 
corruption for personal gain; however, the varying degrees of acceptability for these 
different types of corruption remains obscure. The results indicate that there is a 
difference in relation to the reporting on the intent of the corruption scandal. In the first 
case, the discourse shapes the scandal as having a specific purpose, which is to buy 
votes in congress to gain a majority to pass legislation. This is also illustrated through a 
greater emphasis on an analysis of the causes of the corruption scheme. In the second 
case, there is less of a discussion surrounding the intent of the corruption scheme, rather 
the focus is upon describing the vast amounts of money involved, from which 
contracting companies benefited, as well as reporting on which politicians and 
businessmen are standing trial and being sentenced to prison. Little to no analysis is 
presented surrounding the causes of the situation.  
Though the types of corruption are presented differently, there is little evidence 
to suggest that the first type of corruption is more acceptable or tolerated by the public 
than the second, as I had imagined would be the case.  
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Analysis of the Role of Media Agenda Setting and Framing 
The large quantity of articles published that discuss both corruption scandals 
over time confirms that the media sets the agenda that corruption is an important issue 
to the public in relation to both corruption scandals. The Petrolão scandal has had 
consistent coverage from the year the scandal was revealed in 2014 throughout the 
ongoing investigation procedure. Similarly, continuous coverage is evident across time 
in relation to the Mensalão scandal as the publication of articles commenting on it range 
from the scandal’s initial revelation in 2005 through the years leading up to the trial in 
2012, and continues to this year. This consistency in reporting means that the issue of 
corruption is still relevant to the media agenda, and in turn remains important to the 
public agenda as well. This agenda setting function is evident in both scandals.  
 Taking the analysis to a deeper level upon an examination of second level 
agenda setting, the literature emphasizes how the media sets the agenda but does not 
fully address under what conditions framing takes place to change public opinion. The 
data indicates that variation exists in levels of media framing across scandals. My 
content analysis reveals that framing was more prevalent in the coverage of the 
Mensalão than on the Petrolão, as the media served a more analytical function which 
helped to shape public perceptions in the first case, whereas the media played a more 
informative rather than framing role in the second case. 
This framing function is evident as more coverage of the Mensalão scandal 
(61%) pointed to an analysis of the greater significance and impact of the scandal, 
whereas in the Petrolão case only 40% attempt to provide this type of analysis. This 
means that the Mensalão corpus placed greater priority on shaping public opinion in 
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relation to the detrimental impact that corruption holds for destabilizing Brazilian 
democratic institutions. In addition, this space was utilized as a platform to call for 
urgent political and judicial reforms to curb future corruption practices. Even in the face 
of media frames, public backlash in the face of the Mensalão scandal was minimal, 
suggesting that the positive economic environment and the nature of the corruption may 
have had more significant effects on the level and nature of public opinion and 
collective action.  
On the other hand, coverage of the Petrolão scandal was more focused on 
documenting the steps of the trial procedure in relation to positive coverage of the 
judges, the continuous new pieces of crucial evidence emerging, and the flow of high 
level politicians and businessmen sentenced to prison. The fact that the Petrolão 
represents a second corruption scandal of even greater magnitude than the Mensalão – 
which was still fresh in the public’s memory because of the 2012 trial – might have 
exacerbated public reaction independent of media framing because it pointed to the lack 
of steadfast anti-corruption mechanisms implemented to break the continuous cycle of 
systemic corruption.  
Independently of the reasons, it is clear that the media largely played an 
informative role during the Petrobas scandal and undertook very little second level 
agenda setting, suggesting that an important area for future research is understanding 
the variation in the degree and nature of media agenda setting across different time 
periods and news stories. 
As previously mentioned, Brazilians typically accept corruption as unavoidable 
and pervasive. This notion is not unique to Brazil, and also prevails in other countries, 
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especially in environments where the mechanisms and resources to effectively combat 
corruption are inefficient. However, the Brazilian corruption cases reveal that despite 
this view, citizens can only endure corruption for so long. Even though corruption is 
seen as unavoidable, the fact that knowledge and information about the corruption 
schemes was made readily available to the public through the news media coverage and 
framing, contributed to a heightened sense of urgency previously undemonstrated. The 
vast majority of Brazilians are outraged with the situation that characterizes the intricate 
web of systemic corruption within the Brazilian government, which has reached absurd 
and almost incomprehensible proportions. The cases suggest that citizens cannot endure 
pervasive corruption endlessly; at some point silence is no longer tolerated as a viable 
option and society mobilizes to demand change.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions  
This thesis investigated the two largest corruption scandals in Brazilian history 
that have shocked public opinion and contributed to a presidential impeachment. The 
focus of this research attempts to understand under what conditions do corruption 
scandals generate large-scale public backlash. I have proposed that the key factors that 
shape public discontent are: the type of corruption as defined by intent (political 
expediency or personal enrichment), the broader context particularly the state of the 
economy, and the media coverage regarding how the media sets the public agenda and 
frames the scandals. This study was accomplished through a news media content 
analysis of Folha de São Paulo, one of Brazil’s largest and most popular news outlets, 
through analysis and coding of 132 articles covering these corruption scandals.  
The results are varied and do not always support my initial hypothesis, but serve 
to shed light upon the gaps in the existing literature that fail to point out the variation in 
terms of when second level agenda setting comes into play and the impact that different 
types of corruption may produce. 
Overall the media coverage of both corruption scandals suggests that the 
institutions are functioning despite corruption, that the judiciary and police are 
investigating corruption and holding politicians accountable, but also that corruption is 
a major issue that threatens Brazilian systems and institutions and must be dealt with 
properly. In both cases, first order agenda setting is taking place – the media are 
signaling to the public that corruption is an important issue to which Brazilians should 
be paying attention. Yet the degree of second level agenda setting undertaken by media 
outlets varies across the scandals. The results support the notion that framing does occur 
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in relation to the discourse on key political figures involved in the scandals and the 
significance or lack thereof related to the state of the economy. Yet framing does not 
come into play in relation to shaping opinions regarding the type of corruption involved 
in the scandals. This points to how the media plays a different role in relation to each 
corruption scandal, where in the first case, the media plays a more analytical role, 
whereas in the second case the media plays a more informative role.  
There are several possible explanations for why second level agenda setting was 
less prevalent in relation to the second case than the first case. This trend could prevail 
because the second case is still ongoing so there is less room for analysis and a greater 
need for information as new milestones present themselves. In contrast, since more time 
passed since the Mensalão scandal broke until the julgamento trial procedure, there is 
more room to analyze and critically evaluate past occurrences in light of the current 
situation. Another reason may be that the Petrolão case seems more complicated 
because there are more intricate layers to unravel and a greater variety of players 
ranging from politicians to businessmen, contracting companies, and national and 
international banks. In this sense, there may be a greater need for information on the 
role of each player involved, rather than to frame the situation in a specific manner. 
Similarly, it is possible that as social media has become the sphere where opinions are 
expressed, traditional news media outlets have started to specialize in informative, 
unbiased coverage. Facebook groups that organize events and protests thread posts that 
allow for debate and proposing opinions, which may be more influential in shaping 
public opinion than newspaper articles. All these factors may contribute to explain why 
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there is less evidence of second level agenda setting in relation to the Petrolão 
corruption scandal.  
As for the economic aspect, my research indicates that in Brazil the state of the 
economy is a strong determining factor that shapes public perceptions either concerning 
the importance of corruption as a major issue that the country must deal with, or 
whether corruption is relatively overlooked and other issues are deemed more important 
on the public agenda. To test whether this trend holds true more generally, further 
research could be conducted to compare the Brazilian case with corruption scandals 
being investigated across other Latin American nations with similar contexts of 
economic growth or economic prosperity. For example, another study could compare 
the situation with Chile, a nation that historically possesses the lowest levels of 
corruption in Latin America and also experiences economic stability, or with 
Venezuela, a country that is currently suffering a political and economic crisis. 
Regarding the third component, the results indicate that the media depicted the 
different types of corruption, however this was not enough for the public to perceive the 
scandals in vastly distinct manners, and instead protestors demanded the end of 
corruption as an all-encompassing term. The fact that the public did not distinguish 
between the different types of corruption associated with the cases examined poses 
interesting implications for devising strategies to combat corruption and for politicians 
to gain or maintain public support. Unanswered questions from this section include: 
How do public perceptions of corruption shape initiatives to combat corruption?  
Should a nation tackle corruption in the same manner regardless of the type of 
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corruption involved? Does the type of corruption shape public perceptions in other 
countries and under other contexts?  
Overall, the results of my research indicate that the type of corruption was not 
seen as maintaining an important impact on public opinion, media did not play as 
fundamental a role in shaping public perceptions as expected, and only the economic 
climate was discovered to be significant. As there are many factors involved in shaping 
public opinion, it remains to be explored, which other factors are more important in 
shaping public backlash. I am also interested in the gender dimension and in 
investigating how gender roles may have shaped public opinion differently in the Lula 
and Dilma contexts. An unanswered question in this regard: to what extent do gender 
roles impact public perceptions of corruption scandals? In addition to the gender 
dimension, another interesting factor to explore would be the differing personalities of 
the two politicians; Lula is an extremely charismatic individual, whereas Dilma’s public 
speaking skills are lacking (as countless memes and YouTube videos depict). It would 
be interesting to investigate what roles social media depictions and humor play in 
shaping public perceptions of the politicians and the corruption scandals. 
This also opens up what could be done to further expand upon my findings. 
First, I would have liked to include different news sources, including a strongly 
conservative source and a left leaning one to better understand the ideological 
dimension involved in news media coverage of the corruption scandals. I would also 
suggest propagating the investigation further to encompass social media platforms to 
understand how social media shapes public opinion in relation to corruption scandals.  
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On a final note, although my hypotheses were not always supported, and the 
factors that impact the differing levels of public backlash against the two corruptions 
scandals still need to be further investigated, an important take away message is that 
although Brazil experiences systemic corruption, the elements seem to be present to 
move foreword to combat corruption. The principal institutions that serve as checks and 
balances upon the government are the judiciary, the media, and civil society. Ideally, 
freedom of press and investigative journalism that exposes corruption, an effective and 
independent judiciary that convicts corrupt practices, and an active civil society that 
demands higher government transparency and accountability, can all function in 
conjunction to mitigate corruption. The fact that these three elements appeared within 
the context of the Mensalão and the Petrolão corruption scandals can be viewed as an 
important sign of progress within the framework of a properly functioning democratic 
system. The media investigated and published news articles exposing the corruption 
scandals without government censorship. Once the events were brought to public 
attention, sectors of the population mobilized and voiced their frustrations with the 
government through mass protests. The subsequent public outrage that the scandals 
generated points to how the standards for assessing politicians have risen, not only in 
Brazil but across Latin America, as citizens reject the longstanding traditions of 
impunity and demand that politicians be held accountable. The scandals also tested the 
efficiency of the judiciary system, which in Brazil seems to be proving itself capable. 
The federal investigations resulted in prosecutions and convictions of high profile 
politicians and businessmen, which is an important step in tackling corruption.  
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The success of the investigations and trials are mirrored not only in the Brazilian 
news media but also recognized internationally as the Operation Car Wash Task Force 
(Força-Tarefa Lava Jato) won Transparency International’s 2016 Anti-Corruption 
Award for their efforts to end endemic corruption in Brazil. The Petrobras case is one 
of the world’s biggest corruption scandals and the ongoing Lava Jato investigation 
since April 2014 has resulted in over 240 criminal charges and 118 convictions, 
including some of Brazil’s more powerful political and economic elite (TI, 2016). This 
means that though the problem of systemic corruption is deeply engrained into the 
Brazilian political system, the anticorruption mechanisms seem to be functioning and 
hopefully can continue to improve the situation and meet the society’s demands.   
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Glossary  
AGU: Advocacia-Geral da União - Federal Attorney General. 
Bribery: An exchange between two participants, in which the one who bribes receives 
a good or service that would otherwise have not been granted, and the one who 
accepts the bribe is an official or holds a position of trust. 
BRICS: Top five emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa.  
Caixa 2: Uncontested and undeclared financial resources or electoral donations utilized 
as a form of tax evasion and similar to a slush fund.   
Collor de Mello, Fernando: Former Brazilian president who resigned in the midst of 
his impeachment trial for corruption (campaign financing issues) in 1992.    
CPI: Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito – Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, a 
commission led by the legislative branch in order to investigate allegations of 
irregularities within the public sector. 
CPI: Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, an annual ranking of 
countries based upon perceived levels of corruption.  
Cunha, Eduardo: A Brazilian politician and Ex-President of the Chamber of Deputies 
(Speaker of the House) who initiated Dilma’s impeachment process. In March 
2017 he was found guilty of corruption, tax evasion, and money laundering 
related to the Petrolão corruption scheme and sentenced to 15 years in prison.   
Datafolha: A Brazilian polling institute that conducts public opinion surveys for Grupo 
Folha (the media conglomerate that publishes Folha de São Paulo).     
Folha de Sao Paulo: One of the most popular media outlets in Brazil from the state of 
São Paulo, with a center-left ideological orientation.    
IBGE: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estadística - The Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics, a federal agency that collects national statistical data.   
IBOPE: Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estadística - Brazilian Institute of 
Public Opinion and Statistics, a major polling institution in Brazil.   
Jefferson, Roberto: A Brazilian politician from the PTB - Brazilian Labor Party, and 
the whistle blower of the Mensalão scandal.  
Kickback: A bribe in which the money is paid after the service has been rendered. 
LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project, a research project through Vanderbilt 
University that focuses on public opinion surveys.  
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Latinobarómetro: Opinión Pública Latinoamericana - Latin American Public Opinion, 
a public opinion survey database that originates in Chile.   
Lava Jato: “Operation Car Wash” the ongoing federal investigation following the 
Petrolão corruption scandal, carried out by the Federal Police of Brazil and 
commanded judicially by Judge Sérgio Moro. 
Mensalão: A corruption scandal that broke in 2005, involving bribery and vote buying 
to form political coalitions.  
Money Laundering: Concealment of the origin of illegally obtained funds, typically 
via transferring money through businesses or foreign bank accounts.  
Moro, Sergio: Brazilian Federal Judge, head of the Lava Jato trial.  
MPF: Ministério Público Federal - Federal Public Prosecutor  
O Globo: The top media outlet in Brazil from the state of Rio de Janeiro that maintains 
a conservative ideological orientation.  
Petrobras: Brazil’s largest national oil company, at the center of the Petrolão 
corruption scandal.   
Petrolão: A corruption scandal involving Petrobras and kickbacks for overinflated 
contracts. 
PF: Polícia Federal – The Brazilian Federal Police, involved in the corruption 
investigations.  
Pork barrel politics: Refers to the appropriation of government spending for localized 
projects to bring money into a certain representative’s district in order to gain 
their support in the form of campaign financing or votes. 
PSDB: Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira - Brazilian Social Democracy Party.  
PT: Partido dos Trabalhadores - The Workers Party, the political party that both Lula 
da Silva and Dilma Rousseff represent.   
PTB: Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro - The Brazilian Labor Party.  
Rousseff, Dilma: Brazil’s first female president. Elected in 2011 and impeached in 
2016 before the end of her second term in office. Tied to the Petrobras 
corruption scandal.  
Temer, Michel. The current President of Brazil who took office after Dilma’s 
impeachment as he was the Vice President. His government is center-right. He 
has been cited for involvement in the Petrolão corruption scandal but currently 
maintains presidential immunity from investigation.    
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da Silva, Luiz Inácio Lula: Brazil’s president from 2003-2010 who was tied to the 
Mensalão corruption scandal. Referred to as Lula.  
STF: Supremo Tribunal Federal – The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court.  
WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators, a World Bank database that measures the 
quality of governance through six primary indicators of good governance. 
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